Similar to post-industrial countries in Europe, newly industrialized countries in Asia have entered an era of below-replacement fertility.  Indeed, the total fertility rates for Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan in 2009 were 1.4, 1.2, 1.1, and 1.0, respectively.  Governments are trying to raise fertility to prevent population decline and to preclude drastic population aging.  This paper analyzes qualitative data collected in Singapore in 2007 and 2008 through semi-structured personal interviews with 165 women of childbearing age and 39 focus group discussions regarding their views and lived experiences of recent state policies aimed at encouraging citizens to give births.  My analysis suggests that the interviewees consider childbearing as a long-term commitment and want more direct and universal state subsidies (especially for education and healthcare) amid inflation and job insecurity.  The current incentives are perceived only as short-term benefits and thus have limited effectiveness.  At the same time, respondents remain convinced that their own family members would be the best/ideal caregivers for young children, and the unavailability of such informal support hinders positive childbearing decision-making.  This paper suggests that, while the second demographic transition in Europe has been theorized as a function of individualization, life-style choice, and transformation of intimacy (van de Kaa 1987, Lesthaeghe 1991, Giddens 1995), the persistent low fertility in Singapore is remarkably a function of the liberal familialist welfare regime (Ochiai, 2010) and the attendant relatively under-developed state provisions of welfare and social protection.  It thus complements the rich literature of social policy in East and Southeast Asia (Haggard 1990; Mok, 2009; Peng 2002, 2004; Ramesh, 2004) and existing studies of low fertility based on decontextulized large scale probability sampling surveys.

This article aims to explain the way in which South Korea has taken the path to a 'small' welfare state since the 1990s in the post-democratization era. This studyasks and answers why the universalization of public programs has rapidly occurred and at the same why Korea has mainly remained the smallest welfare state among OECD countries today. Characterization of recent welfare changes in South Korea as a 'small' welfare state seems to contrast with the argument that democratization politics has played a crucial role in upgrading the Korean welfare state since the 1990s. But it is not the same explanation as what the 'productivist welfare capitalism' suggests.The framework of 'incremental change of institution' is useful in analyzing patterns of continuity and change of social policy institutions, overcoming both functionalist aspects of democratization thesis and the static model of the productivist welfare capitalism.We need to look at the ways in which defenders and challengers compromise, and its consequences. This analysis has two advantages: 1) we can pay more attention to defenders' reinterpretation of the institutional rule and their active roles in the rule revision and 2) we can analyze the effects of the pre-existing rule on challengers, and their limitations of alternatives. In the rule-remaking process of public programs, we have definitely witnessed the democratization of social rights, but we have seen bureaucratization reinforced and marketization introduced simultaneously.In addition to the analysis of such a rule-remaking process of public programs, it is critical for us to look at whether 'functional equivalents' to public welfare programs have been incrementally transferred to public sphere or more broadly applied. Capital and labor, as main financial contributors and tax-payers, have been passive in the universalization of social insurance programs and the growth of public welfare, pursuing segementalist social insurance programs and importantly expandingcorporate welfare programs as functional equivalents to public programs.The private sector actors' responses along with the public sector actors' havecontributed to the building ofa'small' welfare state in South Koreain the post-democratization period.

During the "golden age of the welfare state", from the end of World War II until the middle of the 1970ies, the Taiwanese welfare Systems was relative residual. However, after the 1980ies, while most developed countries faced a tendency of welfare retrenchment, the Taiwanese Welfare System expanded rapidly and until recently, there is still no tendency for major social welfare retrenchments in Taiwan. In other words, the logic of Taiwanese welfare development can be described as "old politics" in term of Paul Pierson. This means politics does matter for the development of social welfare in Taiwan.
Since the major social cleavage in Taiwan is not class or left-right schema, but ethnical background and national identity among the population. The Power Resource Theories or Party-deference approach can not give a satisfied answer why Taiwanese welfare Systems expanded rapidly in the 1990ties, but relative slower in the 2000ties. These welfare state developments theories can neither give a comprehensive insight into the Taiwanese welfare state and its background, nor explains why the welfare development in Taiwan was relatively more expanded than Korea in the 1990ties. We argue the institutional or functional approaches show also limitation when applying to examine the welfare state development in Taiwan. 
This study combined the theories of welfare state development and researches of ethnical groups in Taiwan. We argue the factor "ethnical group" plays a significant role behind the dynamic of Taiwanese social welfare development, especially in the 1990ties. The welfare debate was influenced by the background that the social protection for Veterans was much better than other citizens. Since the majority among them were from Mainland China after 1949, the than opposition party DPP demanded therefore a "fair" social welfare Systems in the earlier 1990ties. This leaded to quickly introduction of the National Health Insurance and social allowance System for Farmers. But after the introduction of social allowances systems for the Elderly citizens in 2002, the differences of the social protection for difference ethical groups was reduced. We argue that the factor "ethnical groups" did not have the same impact after 2002.

After the 1970's Energy Crisis, the New Right ideology, which was composed of neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism, was widely accepted in the western welfare state to downsize the scope of state and reallocate the welfare responsibility among state, society, family and individual. Public Private Partnerships, or PPP, has become a crucial issue in welfare governance. State has transformed to an enabler rather than a provider in welfare provision. It purchases welfare services from NGOs to serve citizens within the new financial arrangement and regulatory framework in accordance with the theory of New Public Management.

Hong Kong is a typical case of use of PPP in welfare services. Since 1970s, more than 90% of welfare services have been delivered by NGOs with substantial financial support of government. Given annual substantial public expenditure invested in NGOs, colonial Hong Kong government has repeatedly emphasized the importance of accountability in its White Papers on Social Welfare.

In the face of several political-economic problems, the colonial government of Hong Kong launched social welfare subvention reform in the mid-1990s based on the tenets of New Public Management. Accountability and customer-oriented services are the focus of new Lump Sum Grant Subvention System, comprising Lump Sum Grant Subvention, Competitive Bidding, and Service Performance Monitoring System. It is the first time that government formulates a policy framework to carry out accountability in PPP in Hong Kong social welfare.

Employing the political economy theoretical framework, this study critically analyze the PPP in Hong Kong social welfare service under New Public Management welfare governance model by examining how NGOs' access to power and resource for survival and development as well as playing their roles in the new subvention system. The study reveals that in current PPP in Hong Kong social welfare, the power is not being shared equally. Government possesses power over resource allocation, service standard setting, and so on. The existing accountability arrangement in PPP is partial and incomplete. NGOs and social workers are being kept constantly on the run due to shirking resources and increasing accountability expectation.